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Abstract 
It is ironic that the travelogue of a French aristocrat became one of the canonical texts of A-
merican democracy. Even today, American liberals and conservatives rely on De la Démocra-
tie en Amérique to support their arguments and assume that Tocqueville’s insights, including 
his conviction that voluntary associations are the bedrock of American democracy, are still 
relevant today. However, in a historical and transnational perspective, Tocqueville’s famous 
passages in Democracy in America are as unexceptional as the American society of his time, 
given the enthusiasm for associative sociability by eighteenth and nineteenth-century practi-
tioners of civil society in France, Germany, the Habsburg Empire and Russia. Revisiting the 
history of these “sociable societies” provides an answer to the question whether voluntary 
associations can be considered schools for democracy or not. 
 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Es entbehrt nicht der Ironie, dass der Reisebericht eines französischen Aristokraten zu einem 
kanonischen Text der amerikanischen Demokratie aufstieg. Noch heute berufen sich Liberale 
wie Konservative in den Vereinigten Staaten auf De la Démocratie en Amérique, um ihren 
politischen Argumenten Gewicht zu geben. Dabei gehen sie davon aus, dass Tocquevilles 
Analysen, insbesondere seine Überzeugung, die Grundlage der amerikanischen Demokratie 
beruhe auf ihren freien Vereinigungen, noch heute von Bedeutung sind. Aus historischer und 
transnational vergleichender Perspektive lässt sich aber feststellen, dass Tocquevilles Einsich-
ten in Die Demokratie in Amerika ebenso wenig einen Sonderstatus einnehmen wie die ame-
rikanische Gesellschaft seiner Zeit. Das zeigt die Leidenschaft der Praktiker der Bürgergesell-
schaft für gesellige Vereine in Frankreich, den deutschen Staaten, dem Habsburgerreich und 
Rußland im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert. Ein neuer Blick auf die Geschichte dieser ‚geselligen 
Gesellschaften’ gibt Antwort auf die Frage, ob freie Vereinigungen Schulen der Demokratie 
sind oder nicht. 
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It is ironic that a French aristocrat wrote one of the canonical texts of American democracy.  
Even today, American liberals and conservatives rely on Alexis de Tocqueville’s travelogue, 
published in two volumes in 1835 and 1840, to support their arguments.  Sociologists and 
political scientists also assume that Tocqueville’s insights, including his conviction that vol-
untary associations are the bedrock of American democracy, are still relevant today.  Toc-
queville marveled at the way Americans participated in countless associations, thereby breath-
ing life into their democracy.  This kind of civic activity was fundamentally different from 
what he observed in continental Europe. 
Echoing the connection Tocqueville made between associations and democracy, the po-
litical scientist Robert Putnam was alarmed by the initial findings of empirical research that 
he published in his 1995 Journal of Democracy article “Bowling Alone.”  He found that al-
though there were more American bowlers than ever before, fewer and fewer belonged to 
bowling clubs.  Membership in associations as varied as the Boy Scouts, the Red Cross, and 
the Freemasons had also sunk dramatically in the previous forty years, as had participation in 
local civic life.  Only national organizations like the American Association of Retired Per-
sons, which promote merely special interests and offer no sociability, continued to flourish.1  
Americans no longer go bowling together: they watch television, surf the Internet, and are 
represented by organizations with which they communicate exclusively by mail.  For Putnam 
there can be no true democracy, but only a “couch potato democracy,” if citizens do not par-
ticipate actively in civic associations.  Even the fact that Americans are increasingly willing to 
subsidize charities that benefit the community is, for Putnam, no substitute for social inter-
course.  “Social capital,” that is, specific, measurable resources of civic life, which in turn 
build on social networks, norms, and trust, is more important for a democracy than individual 
acts of charity. 
Putnam became a public figure almost overnight thanks to his thesis that twentieth-
century Americans had lost the social capital they had accumulated by participating in volun-
tary associations since the beginning of the Republic.  “Bowling alone ” became a catch-
phrase, like David Riesman’s “lonely crowd” of the 1950s or, more recently, Robert Bellah’s 
”habits of the heart.”  These phrases were also the titles of best selling sociological studies 
that asserted that isolation and lack of public spirit endangered the polity.  Since the publica-
tion of “Bowling Alone,” Putnam, whose work had never attracted much attention outside 
academic circles, has become a public figure associated with the call to “reinvest” in social 
capital.  His thesis not only provoked discussion, but also generated ambitious, quantitative 
                                                 
1  Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone:  “America’s Declining Social Capital,” Journal of Democracy 6 (1995): 
65-78; “The Strange Disappearance of Civic America,” American Prospect 24 (1996): 34-48, and, more recently, 
Bowling Alone:  The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York, 2000).  Putnam had already 
argued in his classic study of the difference in political culture between northern and southern Italy that democ-
racy depends on the historical tradition of civic engagement through voluntary associations.  Robert D. Putnam, 
Making Democracy Work:  Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, N.J., 1993), esp. pp. 89ff. 
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research projects (one undertaken by Putnam himself and one directed by his Harvard col-
league Theda Skocpol) that have produced contradictory results.2  
This paper will not take up the question of whether or not Americans today actually par-
ticipate less in voluntary associations.  Rather, I will examine, in historical and comparative 
perspective, several of Putnam’s (and his critics') underlying assumptions, assumptions that 
call upon Tocqueville and his understanding of American democracy and are essential in giv-
ing Putnam's empirical findings their putative political weight. In other words, I will histori-
cize the argument, which has attained the status of a dogma, that voluntary associations and 
democratic governance are intimately connected.  Accordingly, I will first revisit the argu-
ment as it appears in Democracy in America.  Why did Tocqueville believe that voluntary 
associations were vital to democracy?  How can we explain his passionate call for a political 
science concerned primarily with the study of associations?  I will then place Tocqueville’s 
thesis in the context of what might be called the “sociable society” of the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries.  Here, I seek to question the notion that the diffusion and popularity of vol-
untary associations is a unique feature of American society and democracy.  On the contrary, I 
will suggest that Tocqueville’s argument is intimately bound to a common European, transat-
lantic civic tradition and will illuminate the entanglements and variations in which this tradi-
tion manifested itself historically. Finally, I will contrast Tocqueville’s thesis (as well as those 
of his current followers) with the history of civil society especially in the late nineteenth cen-
tury when “club mania” reached its height.  Can voluntary associations, from an historical 
perspective, be considered schools for democracy?  Or does the call for virtue and common 
civic purpose accompanied by the associational enthusiasm inevitably create undemocratic 
practices, such as the social and moral disciplining of those who are not considered virtuous, 
which in turn provoke the formation of associations with different political imperatives?  
I. Tocqueville as Analyst of the Human Soul in the Age of Democracy 
Tocqueville discusses voluntary associations in both parts of Democracy in America, albeit in 
different ways.  In the first part of his work, an analysis of the United States‘ political system, 
Tocqueville attributes to associations a significance that is widely accepted today and reso-
nates within the work of Putnam and others.  Americans, according to Tocqueville, resolve 
their social and political differences not by turning to the authorities but by establishing an 
association.  In this way they take responsibility for their own lives and work toward the 
common good.  Americans constantly form a bewildering range of associations, some of 
which, like the temperance associations, promoted goals that seemed quite strange to the 
French nobleman.  Tocqueville identified freedom of association, even more than freedom of 
                                                 
2  Putnam, Bowling Alone; Gerald Gamm and Robert D. Putnam, “The Growth of Voluntary Associations in 
America, 1840-1940,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 29 (1999): 511-57; Theda Skocpol and Morris Fior-
ing, eds., Civic Engagement in American Democracy (Washington, D.C., 1999); Theda Skocpol, “The Toc-
queville Problem: Civic Engagement in American Democracy, ” Social Science History 21 (1997): 455-79. 
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the press, as one of the most important political rights.  Despite some dangers which he attrib-
uted to the freedom of association, he recognized that it provided a defense against an even 
greater danger inherent in a democracy: the political tyranny of the majority.3 
It would be misleading, however, to interpret Tocqueville’s ideas as if he were an early 
sociologist studying political institutions, or to see his emphasis on associations simply as a 
call for more civic engagement and more levels of mediating power.  Tocqueville was skepti-
cal about democracy and hostile to the nascent sociological scholarship of his day, as Wilhelm 
Hennis showed in a brilliant essay twenty years ago.  Tocqueville was looking for a way to 
prevent the separation between man and citizen and between individual and society.  As Hen-
nis puts it: “The relationship between man and citizen is the central problem in truly political 
thinking.  By contrast, for sociologists, it is no longer a problem.”  This preoccupation set 
Tocqueville apart from his younger contemporary Karl Marx.  ”Tocqueville, much more real-
istically than Marx, could only see the elimination of the problem in the framework of an 
egalitarian democratic tyranny.  The driving force of his intense, intellectual approach was to 
prevent the problem from being eliminated in this way.”4 
Tocqueville continued the tradition in classical political theory that investigates the im-
pact a form of government has on its citizens and their virtue and measures the quality of the 
government accordingly.  His primary concern was not just the political constitution of a pol-
ity but rather the ”constitution of the souls” the polity produces.  That is say, he was con-
cerned with the social and moral basis of politics, an issue that contemporary political scien-
tists tend to view as extrinsic to their field.5  Tocqueville considered human feelings and the 
process of their formation more significant for politics than rationally thought-out rights and 
interests.  He was convinced that ”states were not defined by their laws, but rather from their 
origins by the feelings, thought processes, ideas, and hearts and minds of their inhabitants.”6  
As an ”aristocratic liberal,” Tocqueville shared a skepticism about the coming democratic age 
with his contemporaries John Stuart Mill and Jacob Burckhardt.7  He considered himself, in 
the words of Hennis, an ”historian of the soul,” an analyst of the order and disorder of human 
                                                 
3  Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop (Chicago, 2000), 
p. 183.  
4  Wilhelm Hennis, “Tocquevilles ’Neue Politische Wissenschaft’,” Aspekte der Kultursoziologie, ed. Justin 
Stagl (Berlin 1982), pp. 385-407, 390; Raymond Aron, “Tocqueville and Marx,” in History, Truth, Liberty (Chi-
cago, 1985), pp. 165-95. 
5  See the critical remarks in Herfried Münkler’s introduction to his edited volume Bürgerreligion und Bürger-
tugend:  Debatten über vorpolitische Grundlagen politischer Ordnung (Baden-Baden, 1996), p. 8; and “Politische 
Tugend:  Bedarf die Demokratie einer sozio-moralischen Grundlegung?,” Die Chancen der Freiheit, ed. Herfried 
Münkler (Munich, 1992), pp. 25-46. 
6  Alexis de Tocqueville, Letter dated October, 26, 1853, cited by Hennis, “Tocquevilles ’Neue Politische Wis-
senschaft’,” p. 395. 
7  Alan Kahan, Aristocratic Liberalism:  The Social and Political Thought of Jacob Burckhardt, John Stuart Mill, 
and Alexis de Tocqueville (New York, 1992).  “One person with a belief is a social power equal to ninety-nine 
who have only interests,” wrote John Stuart Mill in his “Representative Government,” cited by Brian Harrison, 
“The Rhetoric of Reform in Modern Britain: 1780-1918, ” in Peaceable Kingdom:  Stability and Change in Mo-
dern Britain (Oxford 1982), p. 378.  
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souls in the age of democracy.8  The decisive question for Tocqueville was how to avoid, par-
ticularly in a democracy, the impoverishment of citizens‘ souls that would lead to despotism. 
Tocqueville thought that voluntary associations were an answer to this question.  There-
fore, the crucial passages about the importance of associations are found in the second part of 
his book, where he discusses the influence of democracy on the sentiments, mores, and man-
ners of its citizens.  This part of Tocqueville’s work deals in particular with Americans‘ emo-
tional life and its impact on politics. ”Sentiments and ideas renew themselves, the heart is 
enlarged, and the human mind is developed only by the reciprocal action of men upon each 
other,” he writes. 9  This idea formed the basis of his political thought.  According to Toc-
queville, human interaction, which was subordinated to strict rules in corporate societies, 
must be artificially brought to life in democratic society.10 ”And this is what associations 
alone can do.”11   
Tocqueville believed that the most significant associations in this regard are those that 
remain purely sociable and exist to improve their members’ mores and manners and to enrich 
their emotional lives.  Such associations are much more significant than those that promoted 
explicitly political or commercial purposes, which Tocqueville discussed in the first part of 
Democracy in America.  Only those associations that are seemingly nonpolitical and above 
special interests free their members from selfishness and create new bonds in modern, egali-
tarian societies.  These are precisely the bonds (liens) that play such an important role in Toc-
queville’s political thought. ”Among the laws that rule human societies,” writes Tocqueville, 
”is one that seems more precise and clearer than all others. In order that men remain civilized 
or become so, the art of association must be developed and perfected among them in the same 
ratio as equality of conditions increases.”12  Conversely, the more the bonds between men 
loosen, the more the political foundation of democratic society erodes. The less citizens prac-
tice l’art de s’associer the greater the toll on their civility and the greater the likelihood that 
equality will degenerate into despotism. 
                                                 
8  Hennis, “Tocquevilles ’Neue Politische Wissenschaft’,” p. 402. 
9  Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop (Chicago, 2000), 
p. 491.  
10  “People today, no longer attached to one another by any ties of caste, guild, or family, are all too inclined to 
be preoccupied with their own private interests, too given to looking out for themselves alone and withdrawing 
into a narrow individualism where all public virtues are smothered.” Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and 
the Revolution [1856], ed. François Furet and Françoise Mélonio (Chicago, 1998), 1: 87. 
11  Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop (Chicago, 
2000), p. 491. See, more generally, André Jardin, Tocqueville: A Biography (New York, 1988), pp. 101-278; 
Lynn L. Marshall and Seymour Drescher, “Americans Historians and Tocqueville’s Democracy, ” Journal of 
American History 55 (1968): 512-32; Sean Wilentz, “Many Democracies: On Tocqueville and Jacksonian Amer-
ica,” in Reconsidering Tocqueville’s ’Democracy in America’, ed. Abraham S. Eisenstadt (New Brunswick, 
N.J., 1988), pp. 207-28; James T. Kloppenberg, “Life Everlasting: Tocqueville in America,” Tocqueville Review 
17 (1996): 19-36. 
12  Tocqueville, Democracy in America, p. 492. 
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In an apocalyptic vision, Tocqueville describes a democratic society no longer supported 
by citizens’ sociability: ”I see an innumerable crowd of like and equal men who resolve on 
themselves without repose, procuring the small and vulgar pleasures with which they fill their 
souls.  Each of them, withdrawn and apart, is like a stranger to the destiny of all the others: his 
children and his particular friends form the whole human species for him;  as for dwelling 
with his fellow citizens, he is beside them, but he does not see them;  he touches them and 
does not feel them; he exists only in himself and for himself alone, and if a family still re-
mains for him, one can at least say that he no longer has a native country.  Above these an 
immense tutelary power is elevated, which alone takes charge of assuring their enjoyments 
and watching over their fate.  It is absolute, detailed, regular, far-seeing, and mild.  It would 
resemble paternal power if, like that, it had for its object to prepare men for manhood; but on 
the contrary, it seeks only to keep them fixed irrevocably in childhood”.13  
Thus, according to Tocqueville, sociability is of the utmost political importance because 
it creates new bonds between individuals, bonds that an emerging democratic society destroys 
as it destroys the old corporate order.  The ”new political science,” which Tocqueville in-
tended to establish as the ”mother science of democratic countries,” was to concern itself pri-
marily with the art of association.  The progress of all other sciences, as he passionately—but 
without consequence for later scholarship—declared, depends on the progress made in this 
new science.14  
It is this political connection between associations and civic virtue that neo-
Tocquevillians today have in mind, though in a far more superficial sense than Tocqueville 
himself, when they lament the decline in voluntary associations.15  When Putnam claims that 
membership in voluntary associations improves citizens’ quality of life, he is referring to the 
practical advantages that will follow when communities attain high ”social capital”: incomes 
will be higher because individuals will have forged economic ties; there will be better educa-
tion, better health, more security, and a lower crime rate.  Putnam is not thinking of what 
Tocqueville believed to be the quality of citizens‘ souls—their civic virtue—as outlandish as 
this belief might seem today. 
                                                 
13  Ibid., p. 663. Tocqueville asserts dryly in the preface to The Old Regime and the Revolution, 1: 88, that even 
twenty years after the publication of Democracy in America nothing had occurred in the world that would have 
caused him to speak and think differently. Democracy continued to conceal the threat of despotism: “the average 
level of hearts and minds will never cease to decline as long as equality and despotism are combined.” 
14  Tocqueville, Democracy in America, p. 492.  
15  See esp. Putnam, Bowling Alone, as well as, for example, Michael Walzer, “The Civil Society Argument, ” 
Dimensions of Radical Democracy, ed. Chantal Mouffe (London, 1992), pp. 89-107. For a more critical stance 
see the articles in Amy Gutmann, ed., Freedom of Association (Princeton, N.J., 1998), and, most recently, Mark 
E. Warren, Democracy and Association (Princeton, N.J., 2001). 
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II. The ”Sociable Society” of the long Nineteenth-Century—from Bos-
ton to Saint Petersburg 
Eighteenth and nineteenth century ”practitioners of civil society” on both sides of the Atlantic 
never doubted the intimate connection between associations, civic virtue, and politics. Toc-
queville was not alone in his views, and it was not just in American society that voluntary 
associations were prized and widespread.  Rather, the emphasis on sociability and civic virtue 
can be seen as part of a specific pan-European, transatlantic discourse, and its attendant social 
practices, from the Enlightenment to the First World War.  What follows is a preliminary at-
tempt to understand the history of associative sociability as an exemplary case of an ”entan-
gled history” or ”histoire croisée” that crosses national boundaries and challenges the nation 
state paradigm.16  
Widely accepted arguments from social history and the history of political ideas run 
counter to this thesis. Stated in simple terms, the thesis claims that classical republicanism and 
civic humanism, with their emphasis on political virtue, traveled from Renaissance Italy to 
eighteenth-century America.  By the end of the century, these concepts were replaced by the 
belief in progress and the pursuit of individual interests, which, by producing equality, ulti-
mately conferred stability on a market society.  However, the Aristotelian discourse on civic 
virtue was not replaced but transformed during the periods of the late Enlightenment and 
early liberalism. Sociability and moral improvement became the path to civic virtue and civil 
society, a transformation that occurred amid the sense of crisis that accompanied the revolu-
tions of the late eighteenth century.  ”For Revolutionary Americans sensibility and sociability 
became modern surrogates for the classical virtue that theorists for millennia had thought nec-
essary for sustaining a republican government,” Gordon Wood has noted. ”Some substitute 
for this ancient martial virtue had to be found, and many discovered it in what was increas-
ingly perceived as the natural sociability, sentimentality, and politeness of people.”17  The 
Enlightenment of the eighteenth century took a variety of forms in the English speaking and 
continental European worlds.  However, all of its manifestations shared a belief in what Kant 
described as the ”unsocial sociability” inherent in human beings, their tendency to isolation 
and their need for association with others.18  This anthropological understanding of civil soci-
ety stayed within the Aristotelian tradition by connecting individual virtue and the common 
good. In their social interactions, human beings were supposed to acquire the social virtues 
they needed as citizens of a polity.  Political theorists as well as lesser known practitioners of 
civil society stated over and over again that sociability led to ”mutual improvement, for in-
                                                 
16  See, most recently, Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, “Vergleich, Transfer, Verflechtung:  Der 
Ansatz der Histoire croisée und die Herausforderung des Transnationalen,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 29 
(2002): 607-36; and, more generally, Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, Geselligkeit und Demokratie: Vereine und zivile 
Gesellschaft im transnationalen Vergleich, 1750-1914 (Göttingen, 2003). 
17  Gorden S. Wood, “The American Love Boat,” review  of Sentimental Democracy:  The Evolution of Amer-
ica’s Romantic Self-Image by Andrew Burstein, [New York 1999], New York Review of Books (October 7, 
1999), as well as Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York, 1991). 
18  Immanuel Kant, “Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Intent [1784],” Basic Writings of Kant, ed. 
Allen W. Wood (New York, 2001), pp. 122-23. 
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creasing our knowledge and mending our hearts.”19  Thus, classical republicanism and 
enlightened liberalism, which intellectual history sharply and unnecessarily separates, share 
the concept that the natural sociability of human beings—their ability to acquire civic virtue 
through association with others and to govern themselves according to the laws of reason—
will counter the modern tendency toward individualism and its corrosive effects on the pol-
ity.20  
This was Tocqueville’s concern, and he was by no means alone.  One only needs to think 
of his liberal contemporaries in southwestern Germany, Carl von Rotteck and Carl Theodor 
Welcker, editors of the famous liberal Staatslexikon, who articulated similar concerns in arti-
cles on ”Association,” ”Gemeinsinn,” (public spirit) and ”Bürgertugend” (civic virtue).21  
They considered free associations ”the source of all higher humanity and culture,” grounded 
in an anthropological ”drive for sociability” and divine providence.  ”Other creatures can sat-
isfy their needs, protect themselves, and fulfill their destinies without a great deal of social 
interaction.  Men can sustain themselves only through associations (that may vary widely in 
time, place, and circumstance) through mutual exchange of ideas, experiences, and abilities.  
It is in precisely these associations that men can attain a higher level of development as well 
as the necessary incentives and means to realize the richness and greatness of their poten-
tial.”22 
Like Tocqueville, Rotteck and Welcker regarded associations as a way to lead individu-
als out of selfishness and isolation.  Consequently, they believed that public spirit was ”the 
                                                 
19  Tristram Burges, Solitude and Society Contrasted (Providence, R.I., 1797), p. 19, cited by Peter Clark, British 
Clubs and Societies 1580-1800:  The Origins of an Associational World (New York, 2000), p. 413; as well as, 
among others, Lawrence E. Klein, Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness:  Moral Discourse and Cultural 
Politics in Early Eighteenth-Century England (Cambridge, 1994); John Mullan, Sentiment and Sociability:  The 
Language of Feeling in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford 1988); Daniel Gorden, Citizens without Sovereignty:  
Equality and Sociability in French Thought, 1670-1789 (Princeton, N.J., 1994). 
20  Similiarly, Kahan, p. 5f.; and Daniel Walker Howe, Making the American Self:  Jonathan Edwards to Abra-
ham Lincoln (Cambridge, Mass., 1997), pp. 10ff.  For the notion of a sharp distinction between classical republi-
canism and liberalism, see, e.g., Joyce Appleby, Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1992); and, of course, John G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment:  Florentine Political 
Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, N.J., 1975); and, especially, “Civic Humanism and Its 
Role in Anglo-American Thought”, Politics, Language, and Time.  Essays on Political Thought and History 
(Chicago, 1989), pp. 80-103; for a good summary of the argument see Daniel T. Rodgers, “Republicanism:  The 
Career of a Concept,” Journal of American History 79 (1992): 1-38. For a comparative perspective see the con-
tributions to Jürgen Heideking and James H. Henretta, eds., Republicanism and Liberalism in America and the 
German States, 1750-1850 (Cambridge, 2002).  
21  See, e.g., Paul Nolte, “Bürgerideal, Gemeinde und Republik: ’Klassischer Republikanismus’ im frühen deut-
schen Liberalismus,” Historische Zeitschrift 254 (1992): 609-56; also, more generally, Dieter Langewiesche, 
“Frühliberalismus und Bürgertum 1815-1849,” in Bürgertum und bürgerlich-liberale Bewegung in Mitteleuropa 
seit dem 18. Jahrhundert, ed. Lothar Gall (Munich, 1997), pp. 63-129. 
22  Carl Theodor Welcker, “Association, Verein, Gesellschaft, Volksversammlung,” Das Staatslexikon:  Encyk-
lopädie der sämmtlichen Staatswissenschaften für alle Stände, ed. Carl von Rotteck and Carl Theodor Welcker 
(Altona, 1835), 2: 21, 23. 
 7
most beautiful fruit of the spirit of association.”23  True virtue consisted in self-denial and a 
willingness to subordinate selfish interests for the common good.  The article on ”Bürger-
tugend” and ”Bürgersinn” contains an even pithier formulation: ”The art of all politics and 
political constitutions, all wisdom about a just and happy formation and preservation of a civil 
society, of civil life and rights, are worthless without civic virtue and its most important fea-
tures: a sense of civility and civic courage. These constitute the lifeblood of civic associations.  
They would wither and die without them.”24  Civic virtue, like virtue in general, is promoted 
through ”spiritual and moral development; education and practice; enlightenment, improve-
ment and strengthening of the moral sense; and subordination of the selfish and immoral to 
the moral.”  The practice of virtue and sociability belong together in civil society.  By con-
trast, absolutism leads to the moral degeneration of citizens; their virtue rots and decays. 
”Despotism, wherever it has thrived, has invariably led to selfishness, sensuousness, coward-
ice, and idleness, thereby corrupting the majority of its citizens, especially its civil servants.”25 
Numerous examples reveal such discursive links between classical republicanism and 
enlightened liberalism during the decades immediately before and after the turn of the nine-
teenth century.  Even more surprising, these examples transcended the borders of the emerg-
ing national states of that time.  One only need be reminded of the Masonic lodges of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which were without question a pan-European and transat-
lantic phenomenon.  Recent studies depict a fundamentally different picture of the lodges than 
that presented in the well-known and influential studies of Reinhart Koselleck and François 
Furet.26  The differences are especially noticeable in the interpretation of Masonic secrecy, a 
practice that appears so bizarre to us today.  Koselleck and Furet, following  Carl Schmitt and 
Augustin Cochin, considered the enlightenment morality of the Freemasons an emancipatory 
ideology of the Third Estate, the new middle class that assembled in the lodges to conspire 
against the state.  In this way, Koselleck and Furet also explain the practice of Masonic se-
crecy. Secrecy opened up a protected space where middle-class Freemasons could claim a 
moral authority that ultimately questioned the political authority of the Old Régime. However, 
recent studies of western European and Russian Freemasonry contend that this interpretation 
does not take into account the Freemasons‘ self image and social practices; moreover, they 
argue that Koselleck and Furet cannot explain the popularity of the lodges in the English-
speaking world.27  In continental Europe the lodges attracted both the aspiring middle classes 
                                                 
23  Carl von Rotteck, “Gemeingeist oder Gemeinsinn,” in Staatslexikon, ed. Rotteck and Welcker (Altona, 1838), 
6: 448. 
24  Carl Theodor Welcker, “Bürgertugend und Bürgersinn,” in Staatslexikon, ed. Rotteck and Welcker (Altona, 
1846), first supplementary vol.: 748. 
25  Ibid., pp. 749-50. 
26  Reinhart Koselleck, Critique and Crisis:  Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society [1959] 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1988); François Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution (Cambridge, 1981). 
27  Margaret C. Jacob, Living the Enlightenment:  Freemasonry and Politics in Eighteenth-Century Europe (New 
York, 1991); Douglas Smith, “Freemasonry and the Public in Eighteenth-Century Russia,” Eighteenth-Century 
Studies 29 (1995): 25-44; and Working the Rough Stone:  Freemasonry and Society in Eighteenth-Century Rus-
sia (DeKalb, Ill., 1999); Robert Beachy, “Club Culture and Social Authority:  Freemasonry in Leipzig, 1741-
1830,” in Paradoxes of Civil Society:  New Perspectives on Modern German and British History, ed. Frank 
Trentmann (Providence, R.I., 2000), pp. 157-75; Steven C. Bullock, Revolutionary Brotherhood:  Freemasonry 
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and the enlightened nobles, who together distinguished themselves from the ”common peo-
ple.”  The mystery-shrouded lodges thus did not serve as meeting places for an enlightened 
counter elite that rejected the monarchical state.  Rather, they became ”places of social com-
promise.”28 
Why, then, did the lodges place so much emphasis on secrecy?  Secrecy was not intended 
to mask political ambition or conspiracy, but to create artificially a protected social space in 
which virtue, the key concept for eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Freemasons, could 
thrive. This explains the popularity of Masonic lodges and secret societies in general in the 
United States after the 1840s—a fact that Tocqueville overlooked.  Like Koselleck and Furet, 
Tocqueville understood secret societies as a consequence of the tension between state and 
society in continental Europe.  Why then should there be secret societies in a democratic 
country with a weak state?  Even in continental Europe, as Margeret C. Jacob has shown, 
Freemasonry preserved the characteristics that stemmed from the political culture of England 
and Scotland at the end of the seventeenth century.  The French, Dutch, and German Masonic 
lodges ”transmitted and textured the Enlightenment, translated all the cultural vocabulary of 
its members into a shared and common experience that was civil and hence political.  Rather 
than imagining the Enlightenment as represented by the politics of Voltaire, or Gibbon, or 
even Rousseau, or worse as being incapable of politics we might just as fruitfully look to the 
lodges for a nascent political modernity.”29  Freemasons corresponded across state bounda-
ries; when they traveled, they could visit lodges in other cities and thereby easily enter local 
society. Thus the political and moral language of the Enlightenment circulated throughout the 
cosmopolitan lodges, regardless of state and cultural boundaries. 
The connection between virtue, sociability, and the improvement of society was funda-
mental for Russian Freemasons as well.  They believed that the cultivation of virtue would 
protect society from moral (and therefore political) corruption, just as Tocqueville maintained.  
The practice of morals and manners, or nravouchenie, led to virtue.  One way of achieving 
this was through the elaborate rituals of Freemasonry. ”The lodge, therefore, occupied a privi-
leged place in the social landscape of the public.  Its inhabitants claimed both to possess secret 
knowledge required to attain virtue and to be the personification of virtue.  This, less than the 
danger of state repression, accounts for the main function of Masonic secrecy.  For through 
their actions, the Masons attempted to establish a hierarchy within the public based not on the 
nobility of one’s family, nor on one’s rank (chin), status at court, or wealth, but on one’s 
proximity to virtue, having placed themselves at its pinnacle.  The Masons saw themselves as 
engaged in nothing less than the construction of a new man, a man of morals and virtue who 
possessed the traits necessary for the maintenance of the social order and the betterment of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
and the Transformation of the American Social Order, 1730-1840 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1996).  For a summary, see 
James Van Horn Melton, The Rise of the Public in Enlightenment Europe (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 252-72.  For 
an excellent commentary on Koselleck and Habermas, see Anthony J. LaVopa, “Conceiving a Public:  Ideas and 
Society in Eighteenth-Century Europe,” Journal of Modern History 64 (1992): 79-116. 
28  Daniel Roche, “Die sociétés de pensée und die aufgeklärten Eliten im 18. Jahrhundert, ” in Sozialgeschichte 
der Aufklärung in Frankreich, ed. Rolf Reichardt and Hans-Ulrich Gumbrecht (Munich, 1981), p. 115; and, in 
general, Les républicains des lettres:  Gens de culture et Lumières au XVIIIe siècle (Paris, 1988). 
29  Jacob, p. 224. 
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common weal.”30  This emphasis on the social value of virtue is not unique to the lodges.  
Rather, it is at the core of both the European Enlightenment and early liberalism and propelled 
the eighteenth and nineteenth century passion for associative sociability. 
The lodges saw themselves in the eighteenth century and even more in the nineteenth 
century as ”schools of civic virtue” in Tocqueville's sense.  For example, one pamphlet circu-
lated by a south German lodge in 1859 states that Freemasonry will accomplish ”what neither 
the state nor the church can.  It will increase and spread inner virtue and probity.”  Civil soci-
ety could not command inner virtue ”without becoming a judge of opinions and thoughts.  
This in turn would lead to the worst kind of tyranny and would be contrary to the true purpose 
of human society.”  Therefore, it was necessary to have social gathering places like the 
lodges, where individuals could ”work the rough stone,” their ”inner sense of morality,” ”in 
order to promote the common good, which civil society could not bring about; to sustain wis-
dom, freedom, and virtue in their essential purity; to eliminate the divisions and rifts that the 
interests of states, religions, estates, and other accidental relationships have created so that 
men can be united once more through their common bonds and be governed according to the 
law of reason.  According to this law we are human beings and nothing else.”31  This moral 
and political self-understanding explains why the lodges stuck to their secret rituals during the 
nineteenth century, a period of increasing openness and publicity.  They wanted to keep one 
place free from the conflicts of an increasingly democratic society, a place where virtue could 
thrive.  This suggests why Masonic lodges and other secret societies did not disappear during 
the century after the Enlightenment, as Tocqueville and many of the historians who followed 
him expected.  Rather, these organizations regained their popularity and importance in Great 
Britain, the United States, France, and the German states in the 1840s; in Italy and Austria-
Hungary in the 1860s; and in Russia in the decade after 1905.32 
The example of the lodges shows that a firm belief in the relationship between associa-
tions and virtue can be found on both sides of the Atlantic during the ”long nineteenth cen-
tury.”  Freemasonry formed a ”sociable International” that spanned the globe from Boston to 
Saint Petersburg and from Copenhagen to Naples.  It encouraged the exchange of ideas and 
opinions, practitioners and practices.  However, Tocqueville attributed the sharp contrast be-
tween American democracy and the societies of continental Europe to the absence of volun-
                                                 
30  Smith, “Freemasonry and the Public,” pp. 35, 37. 
31  Pandora, oder interessante Mittheilungen über alte und neue Freimauerei, aus dem handschriftlichen Nach-
lasse eines Geweihten (Stuttgart, 1859), pp. 38-39. 
32  See, e.g., Philip Nord, “Republicanism and Utopian Vision:  French Freemasonry in the 1860s and 1870s,” 
Journal of Modern History 63 (1991): 213-29; and “Freemasonry,” chapter 1 in The Republican Moment:  
Struggles for Democracy in Nineteenth-Century France (Cambridge, Mass., 1995); Avner Halpern, The Democ-
ratisation of France, 1840-1901:  Sociabilité, Freemasonry and Radicalism (Atlanta, 1999); Sudhir Hazareesingh 
and Vincent Wright, Francs-Maçons sous le Second Empire:  Les Loges provinciales du Grand-Orient á la veille 
de la Troisiéme République (Rennes, 2001); Stefan-Ludwig Hoffman, Die Politik der Geselligkeit:  Freimauer-
logen in der deutschen Bürgergesellschaft, 1840-1918 (Göttingen 2000); and “Nationalism and the Quest for 
Moral Universalism: German Freemasonry, 1860-1914,” in The Mechanics of Internationalism:  Culture, Soci-
ety, and Politics from the 1840s to World War I, ed. Martin H. Geyer and Johannes Paulmann (Oxford, 2001), 
pp. 254-79. 
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tary associations, in particular in France.  The second part of Democracy in America is no 
longer a true travel book but a political theory of civil society. After he completed the first 
part of the manuscript, it dawned on Tocqueville that he was more concerned with the ques-
tion of how equality affects the thoughts, feelings, and habits of citizens than he was about the 
specific manifestations of equality in American society.33  His view of American society was 
one of a French aristocrat engaged in analyzing the dangers that democracy, which he thought 
would inevitably come, held for the old European social order.  This vantage point prevented 
Tocqueville from perceiving the degree to which voluntary associations were already trans-
forming the old regimes on the European continent at the very time he was writing Democ-
racy in America.  As a Parisian aristocrat, the sociability of local civil society in the French 
provinces, where voluntary associations were highly popular, was not part of his experience, 
nor even conceivable.  Because Tocqueville was so preoccupied with the state, he could not 
understand the essential characteristic of voluntary associations: that they are rooted in local 
society.  ”Gentlemen’s clubs, choral groups, learned societies and other associations were all 
predominantly provincial,” as Carol Harrison has shown.  ”In the case of associative sociabil-
ity, Paris was not the best vantage point for the observation of French society.”34  The fact that 
freedom of association was often restricted shows how uneasy the state felt about the sociable 
ambitions of its citizens, but it does not reveal the true extent of urban sociability.  Maurice 
Agulhon’s observation that throughout the nineteenth century a sociable society coexisted 
with a hostile state holds true not only for France.35  Ironically, there is much better documen-
tation for the activities of the voluntary associations in Europe than in the United States, 
thanks to dossiers kept by authorities suspicious of associations. 
As in the case of the lodges, voluntary associations were a product of the language and 
practices of England’s political culture.  England already had large numbers of clubs and as-
sociations during the eighteenth century in addition to the familiar coffeehouses. For example, 
20 percent of the male population of the town of Norwich belonged to a voluntary association 
in 1750.  These clubs and associations spread to New England and to the continent towards 
the end of the eighteenth century.36  On both sides of the Atlantic, the associations now served 
                                                 
33  Marshall and Drescher, pp. 523-24. 
34  Carol E. Harrison, “Unsociable Frenchmen:  Associations and Democracy in Historical Perspective,” Toc-
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Journal 26 (1983): 95-119; Class, Sect, and Party:  The Making of the British Middle Class, 1820-1850 (Man-
chester, 1990); “Clubs, Societies and Associations,” in The Cambridge Social History of Britain, 1750-1950, ed. 
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as social laboratories for civil society following radical political upheaval and crises.  Mary 
Ryan has called the period between 1825 and 1845 as the American ”era of associations.”37 In 
the United States ”men and women came together to form hundreds and thousands of new 
voluntary associations expressive of a wide array of benevolent goals—mechanics’ societies, 
humane societies, societies for the prevention of pauperism, orphans’ asylums, missionary 
societies, marine societies, societies for the suppression of vice and immorality, societies for 
the relief of poor widows, societies for the promotion of industry, indeed societies for just 
about everything that was good and humanitarian.”38  At the same time, a similar network of 
associations arose in France and Germany, which has been studied in detail only recently as 
part of the social and cultural history of the middle classes.39 Even more suprising, associa-
tions mushroomed in societies that did not have a strong ”bourgeoisie”. In Hungary, for ex-
ample, nobles like Count István Széchenyi initiated the founding of numerous Casino socie-
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ties on the model of clubs that he had seen during his travels in England.40  Foreigners who 
emigrated to Russia, especially Englishmen and Germans, founded their own associations 
(first in Saint Petersburg) and opened them to the local elite.  Other cities with large German 
minorities, such as Riga or Moscow, followed Saint Petersburg’s example, as did Saratov 
later in the 1840s.41  
”Moral improvement” and Bildung, obrazovanie and émulation were the terms used in 
different countries to express the political and moral objectives of sociability.  Self-
improvement, derived from social interaction, was intended to generate and strengthen a be-
lief in civic virtue and, more generally, humanity.  This belief often had Christian undertones.  
Tocqueville and many of his contemporaries believed that associative sociability derived its 
deeper meaning from the Christian ethic of brotherly love.42  Only those who learned to gov-
ern themselves, their thoughts, and feelings in associations were capable of governing others.  
The purpose of the associations, similar to that of the lodges, was to pursue individual virtue 
as well as the common good, which were united in the ideal of what Lothar Gall called the 
”klassenlose Bürgergesellschaft” (classless civil society) so typical of the liberalism of the 
time.43  French and German citizens during the early nineteenth century, like their American 
counterparts, believed that individual interests were by definition narrow and politically de-
structive.  Only those capable of renouncing their own interests could open their ”souls” in 
association with others and thus strengthen the bonds of civil society.44   
The associations of the early nineteenth century, which at the time were primarily open 
only to educated and wealthy men, were intended to provide relief from the conflicts that 
arose in a man’s profession, in his family, and in local politics.45  They also clearly provided 
amusement in a socially respectable context.  By joining an association, members became part 
of the sociable society, practicing civility and manly virtue and displaying those qualities to 
the outside community and their families in parades and public gatherings. ”The club's ration-
ale was an alternative to home life, where an ethos of fraternalism replaced the ties of fam-
ily.”46  Naturally, associations also served social and political purposes.  They blurred old 
social boundaries between nobles and bourgeois and created new boundaries between the  
upper and lower classes. The social practice of civic association, like liberalism more gener-
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ally, produced ”tolerance and intolerance—the elastic, always potentially inclusive aspects, 
and the continually contested and renegotiated exclusions which characterized it as well.”47 
It is, however, also clear that nineteenth century passion for association originated in 
large part from a political and moral understanding of the same problems inherent in civil 
society that Tocqueville had described so forcefully.  Tocqueville’s famous passages in De-
mocracy in America, viewed from that perspective, are as unexceptional as the American so-
ciety of his time.  It is misleading to attribute political and social aims to the practitioners of 
late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century civil society, aims that they would not even have been 
able to conceptualize. In their political language, informed by the early modern tradition, 
”Bürgertum” meant civic virtue and a sense for the common good. It did not refer to a socio-
economic class and its political interests.48  By analyzing the political language of the time, 
one can not only detect traces of classical republicanism in nineteenth century liberalism, but 
also liberalism‘s transnational framework.  Only by abandoning social history’s assumption 
that there is a close connection between the emergence of the bourgeoisie as a class and liber-
alism as its emancipatory ideology can one understand the popularity of liberal ideas and 
practices within educated and elite circles in societies that lacked a strong bourgeoisie.  One 
of the most common of these liberal ideas was the notion that one can improve society 
through sociability.49 
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III. ”A Skat Club Is a Skat Club Even if it Calls Itself the ‘Freedom Skat 
Club‘”:  Associations and Democracy at the End of the Nineteenth 
Century 
 ”Liberalism,” as Reinhart Koselleck once observed, ”is best described as a movement that 
consumed itself. That was the price it paid for success.”50  The history of liberal enthusiasm 
for voluntary associations is a case in point.  The passion for association of the first half of the 
nineteenth century turned out to be only a prelude to the ”Vereinswut” (rage de s’associer, 
association mania), as contemporaries called it, that characterized the two decades following 
Tocqueville’s death in 1859.  Voluntary associations grew ever more popular in the 1860s and 
1870s as European and American societies overcame their different political and social crises.  
Associations now sprang up not just from Boston to Saint Petersburg, but also in the west as 
far as San Francisco and in the east as far as Kazan. 
The end of the Civil War and the abolition of slavery ushered in a ”golden age of frater-
nity” in the United States.  Secret societies like the Odd Fellows, the Druids, the Red Men 
(which admitted only palefaces), and the Good Templars flourished. The Masonic lodges and 
the Evangelical moral reform societies, which both originated in England, provided the cul-
tural paradigm for these societies: ”The plain citizen sometimes wearied of his plainness and, 
wanting rites as well as rights, hankered for the ceremonials, grandiloquent titles, and exotic 
costumes of a mystic brotherhood,” as Arthur M. Schlesinger has observed.  New types of 
associations emerged dedicated to specific purposes: leisure, gaining professional advantages, 
or fostering ethnic identities.  Americans were already a ”nation of joiners” during the half 
century before the Civil War; during the decades after the war, however, virtually all impor-
tant social, economic, and cultural developments in American society can be understood in 
the context of the history of voluntary associations.51   
The liberalization occuring in continental European states that were becoming increas-
ingly national societies (or societies divided by nationality, as in the case of Austria-Hungary) 
was also related to the unprecedented growth of associations.  Historians have not recognized 
the extent to which the association movement gained momentum after 1860 in the French and 
German provinces.52  Germany became, like the United States, a nation of joiners.  Belief in 
the intimate connection between sociability and civic virtue did not necessarily disappear as a 
result of the massive increase in less socially exclusive associations such as gymnastic organi-
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zations. Rather, that belief was translated into a new language that appeared to capture the 
sentiments of the time.  For example, an orator at a gymnastic competition in Dessau in 1865 
said, ”Associations constitute a preparatory school for Bürgertum [civic sense]. They allow 
the most beautiful civic virtues to blossom: self-control, manly discipline and modesty, 
friendship and devotion. In sociability the narrowly drawn boundaries of society are blurred; 
men become men (Menschen) and begin to see others as men.”53 
After the Habsburgs loosened the laws governing associations in 1867, the number of 
voluntary associations grew significantly in their empire.  In Pressburg (Bratislava/Pozsony), 
with its Hungarian, German, and Slovakian citizenry, there were only eleven officially ap-
proved associations during the 1850s.  By the 1870s this number rose to approximately 
eighty, encompassing more than eighteen thousand members.54   The industrial city of Aussig 
(Ústí nad Labem) in northern Bohemia had scarcely any associations before 1860.  By 1870 
there were thirty two, and during the following decades this number doubled. These increases 
are representative of the growth of associations throughout the Austrian part of the empire.55  
Likewise, a vibrant associational life arose in Naples after 1860.  Previously, there were only 
a few associations in Italy in northern towns such as Milan.56   
In Russian provincial towns, local society was increasingly shaped by associations after 
the Crimean War and during the period of the ”great reforms,” the greatest being the emanci-
pation of the serfs.  In a multiethnic city such as Odessa there was already an ”English Club” 
in 1831, but many new associations arose later—for instance, a German club called ”Harmo-
nia,” a ”Club of the Well Born,” and a Jewish association known as ”Beseda.”  The new local 
elite of Odessa businessmen, entrepreneurs and government officials met in these clubs and 
associations.57  States now generally policed associations far less systematically, if at all.  
This holds true not just for Russia but also for Germany (in particular after the repeal of the 
law against socialism in 1890) and for Austria-Hungary.58   Historians who do not look be-
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yond a state’s legal restrictions on associations miss the phenomenon completely, just like the 
overworked state authorities did.  And while there were certainly fewer associations in the 
east than in the west, it is astonishing to see the degree to which similar types of associations 
and similar motives for forming associations transcended national boundaries.  It is equally 
remarkable that the enthusiasm for voluntary associations occurred in all these countries si-
multaneously. 
These common features are even more evident during the final wave of association for-
mation, between the late 1880s and the outbreak of the First World War.  Countries that al-
ready had a well-developed network of associations saw the number of those associations 
explode.  For example, membership in secret societies rose to 5.4 million members in the 
United States alone.  According to contemporary estimates, 20 percent of the United States’ 
male population belonged to a secret society.  A review of city directories of twenty-six North 
American towns proves that the late nineteenth century was ”a time of unusually vigorous 
associational growth.”  The increase in voluntary associations at the end of the nineteenth 
century was especially apparent in small towns, just as it was at the beginning of the century. 
Proportionally, associations were less dominant in the rapidly growing metropolises.59  In 
Europe too, there is much evidence that the enormous growth of associations around 1890 
was predominantly a phenomenon of small and midsize towns.  For example, a microeth-
nological study of Weinheim, a small town located between Mannheim and Heidelberg, 
points to an unusually strong growth in voluntary associations after 1890.60  Of the 275 asso-
ciations formed in Roanne (northwest of Lyon) between 1860 and 1914, 90 percent arose after 
1880 and 50 percent after 1900.  As in other French provincial towns, the majority of these 
associations served social aims and not primarily political or special interests.  Together, these 
civic associations formed the social backbone of the Third Republic.61 
Even in those countries, especially Austria-Hungary and Russia, that had had relatively 
few voluntary associations, local society became more and more dominated by associational 
networks as the century drew to a close. For example, Prague's city directory lists seven hun-
dred associations in 1890 but sixteen hundred in 1901. The German-Jewish writer Paul Lepin 
was able to assert that there was no distinct German population in Prague before 1914, just a 
group of German associations.62  As in other parts of the Habsburg empire, associations now 
increasingly served political purposes, constructing ethnic Czechs, Germans, Slovaks, and 
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Hungarians, national boundaries that were not in place before the advent of mass politics.63  
Yet, as Karl F. Bahm has shown, using the example of the German-Czech worker Wenzel 
Holek, individuals could still belong to both socialist and nationalist or German and Czech 
associations.64  
As in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, associations in this period transferred 
ideas and social practices, which often originated in Britain, across national boundaries.  It 
was not unusual for associations to have transnational ties, especially if they pursued common 
goals. Victorian reform societies, such as the temperance movement, even spread their mes-
sage of virtue and alcoholic abstinence to Russia.65  Russian society at the end of the tsars’ 
empire was not simply an affair of the state. It possessed a public sphere of societal relations, 
described by the contemporary term obshchestvennost’.  More than half of the 2,200 charita-
ble organizations that existed in Russia in the early twentieth century were founded after 
1890.66  In 1897 there were 400 voluntary associations in Saint Petersburg, and by 1912 Mos-
cow had 600.  These included museum societies, which are regarded as the classic embodi-
ment of the ideal that civility and moral improvement could by achieved through culture.67  In 
Saratov there were only two associations before 1850, yet by 1899 there were thirty-seven 
and, by 1914 there were 111, ranging from an Esperanto club to a vegetarian society.68  ”With 
their very existence these societies contested the traditional right of the state to represent 
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alone the interests of the people,” as the Russian historian A. S. Tumanova has noted.”69  Be-
cause twentieth century scholarship has focused so exclusively on the tradition of the authori-
tarian state, it has ignored the plethora of associations in central and eastern Europe before the 
First World War.70  In contrast, scholars in the United States and Great Britain, which saw 
their countries in an unbroken liberal tradition, attributed paramount importance to the history 
of voluntary associations as evidence of that continuing liberal tradition. 
A panoramic view from the mid-eighteenth to the early twentieth century reveals a pic-
ture of sociable societies emerging within the anciens régimes of eighteenth-century continen-
tal Europe and spreading in density from west to east as the nineteenth century progressed. By 
1914 virtually all of urban society in Europe revolved around associations even though the 
majority of its states were constitutional monarchies, not democracies.  In the words of Agul-
hon, the trend in association formation was ”multiplication, diversification, and, naturally 
liberalization.”71  In short, there was no decline in civic associations during the second half of 
the nineteenth century.  In fact, the sociable societies of Europe and the United States prove 
the contrary and bear witness to the transnational quest for social and moral improvement 
through association.  That quest binds these societies much closer together than one would 
suspect given the nationalism of the time, or than the historiography of the post-1914 period, 
with its attempts to charge special paths to modernity, would seem to indicate.72 
Yet, even as the spread of voluntary associations reached its apex, suggesting a triumph 
of liberal ideas and practices, criticism of the Vereinsmeierei (club mania) increased. These 
critics included not just Christian conservatives and radical socialists but especially liberals.  
Because the phenomenon of associations became so general, and because the number of asso-
ciations exploded, it seemed difficult to maintain that associating with others promoted the 
political idea of improving mankind through the development of virtue and the sense of com-
mon good.  The more widespread the phenomenon of associations became and the more it 
embraced previously excluded groups, the more unbelievable this claim, along with the reli-
ance on the political power of virtue and civilization, became.  ”A Skat club is still a Skat club 
even if it calls itself ‘Freedom Skat Club‘,” wrote Robert Michels contemptuously in 1906 
when he surveyed what he considered the philistinism of the countless worker associations 
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supposedly devoted to culture.73  It was not the spirit of associations, therefore, that was in 
crisis at the end of the nineteenth century.  It was rather the political and moral vision of a 
society built on associations, a vision Tocqueville had formulated so passionately. 
It should be stressed that this disintegration of the claim to virtue, sociability, and moral 
improvement was a result of democratisation, not the converse.  Worker associations in Eng-
land and Germany that had served to promote social reform and moral ”improvement” within 
the working class under the supervision of liberals evolved in the course of the century into an 
alternative culture that rejected liberal tutelage and conceived its own vision of mutual im-
provement through association.  Workers used associations in turn to mobilize their political 
interests against the moral leadership demands of the liberal elite.74   This trend also led to a 
change in social practices. Nineteenth-century associations had effortlessly combined practi-
cal advantages and Bildung, amusement and political interests.  By the end of the century, 
however,  a multitude of associations emerged that dedicated themselves to the promotion of 
just one of these purposes.  Trade unions and political parties arose out of the associations and 
rid themselves gradually of the social and moral baggage of the sociable society.  They now 
served only to represent special interests and mobilize political action.  It was not just in Eng-
land that working class associations like the ”friendly societies” gave up all pretense of pro-
moting sociability during the last third of the nineteenth century and began instead to function 
exclusively as insurance companies.  Mass culture, which was just beginning to be dominated 
by commercial interests, promoted activities that transcended class, such as sport, for leisure.  
Sports also involved associations, but such organizations were devoted to physical ideals, not 
necessarily ”moral improvement.”75   
European Catholicism, which was seen by contemporaries as the most fierce opponent of 
liberalism, turned to associations to protect itself from the secular state.  It mobilized associa-
tions throughout society, reaching even the rural population, to promote its social purpose and 
political objectives. In this way it resembled the workers’ movement.  It was not just wealth 
or Bildung that determined who belonged to associations before they became democratized at 
the end of the nineteenth century.  Religious affiliation and gender also played important 
roles; civic virtue was equated with both Protestantism and masculinity.  Until the end of the 
nineteenth century, women were mostly excluded from respectable clubs, lodges or civic as-
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sociations.  To be sure, networks of womens’ associations, which often promoted social and 
moral objectives such as charity and social reform, often in evangelical language, were al-
ready emerging by the early nineteenth-century from Boston to Saint Petersburg.  However, 
by the end of the century they contested more fundamentally and with an international scope 
the claim by male sociability to represent moral, and hence political authority.  Jews, who had 
long been excluded from equal participation in civic associations of Central Europe, were 
now more welcome or, with the rise of political anti-Semitism, formed their own associations, 
similar to that of the Masons, such as B’nai B’rith, which was founded by German Jewish 
emigrants in New York in 1843 and, after the 1880s, spread across Europe. 
The particular political and social context of a society determined which minority was 
excluded from ”respectable” sociability.  But few barriers were as severe as those that ex-
cluded African Americans from white, middle class American associations.  These remained 
closed even to free and ”respectable” African Americans, who early on formed their own as-
sociations and secret societies.  In 1818 an English visitor to Philadelphia wrote: ”No respect-
ability, however unquestionable, no property, however large, no character, however unblem-
ished, will gain a man, whose body is (in American estimation) cursed with even a twentieth 
portion of the blood of his African ancestry, admission into Society.”76  Accordingly, African 
Americans in Philadelphia and elsewhere attempted to create lodges and associations that 
surpassed those of the white middle classes in respectability and civic virtue.  The twin phe-
nomena of social exclusion and growing competition in the moral claims that associations 
made promoted their proliferation throughout all the societies under investigation, while at the 
same time calling into question their traditional political and moral imperatives. 
The belief in a connection between association and liberal universalism also suffered as a 
result of yet another Janus-faced liberal success, the rise of nationalism.  The claim to repre-
sent the common good was already interwoven with the idea of the nation in the late Enlight-
enment and early liberal periods.  Tocqueville claimed that the fatherland was both the 
strongest and most durable bond holding men together in a democracy.  And Welcker (to cite 
just those examples referred to earlier) wrote in 1846 that dying for one’s country was the 
highest civic virtue.  This liberal claim would reveal its true meaning only later during the 
period of national wars.77  It is well known that nineteenth-century liberal nationalism organ-
ized itself through associations.  To the degree to which the sociable societies transformed 
themselves into national societies, however, appeals to nationalism represented conflicts 
within and between states rather than an abstract common good.  
The universality of the association and its success during the century before 1914 rested, 
paradoxically, on the fact that civic associations incorporated both universal claims and spe-
cial interests.  Social historians have shown that associations represented the most important 
medium for developing and strengthening new identities in the nineteenth century.  These 
identities could be national, social, religious, or gendered.  Those new identities in turn set 
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their own, occasionally anti-liberal, agendas.  ”The proliferation of associations was not 
matched by a reinforcement of the values of civil society,” as Adrian Lyttelton has observed 
for Italian society.  The more plural the sociable society became in its composition, the more 
fragmented the claim of the liberal Bürger to represent society and to exercise political and 
moral leadership became.78  To be sure, ”the persistence of the association as a model for pub-
lic participation in an age of nationalist political mobilisation guaranteed the survival of much 
of the liberal tradition, its modes of community decision-making, and its distinctive internal 
hierarchies, well into the age of mass politics”. However, as Pieter Judson has also noted for 
the Habsburg Empire, ”the gradual and ongoing integration of new social groups into the 
Bürger polity was bound to weaken the tight hold that the liberal elites had traditionally exer-
cised over local social and political life through their positions in the voluntary associa-
tions.”79  The social democratisation and political diversification of associational life encour-
aged a turn to radical nationalism and ”ethnicism” of the liberal elites (and not just those of 
Austria-Hungary) to reclaim their moral and political leadership, thereby renouncing much of 
early liberalisms universalist aspirations. 
Skepticism arose not just about liberal ideas but also about social manifestations of liber-
alism like the practice of associations.  That laws were passed guaranteeing freedom of asso-
ciation only in 1901 in France and in 1908 in Germany is not a result of a supposedly authori-
tarian character of the state, but rather a reflection of the fear French republicans and German 
liberals had of the political impact of associations, like those under the tutelage of the Catho-
lic church, which did not promote ”progressive” objectives.  The proliferation of the enthusi-
asm for associations through all elements of society spawned a growing fear among liberals 
that society was losing its moral compass, which had previously been guaranteed by the lib-
eral domination of associational life.  Max Weber, for example, declared indignantly at the 
first meeting of German sociologists in 1910 that the modern, ”last man” was ”an association 
man (Vereinsmensch) to a horrible, unimaginable degree.”  ”One has to believe this can not be 
surpassed since associations had been formed whose sole purpose was to eliminate associa-
tions.”80 
This quotation suggests that sociologists and political scientists, practitioners of scholarly 
disciplines that were just emerging in the late nineteenth century, were doubtful about the 
political and moral significance of associations. Despite, or rather precisely because of the 
mass expansion of the phenomenon, they did not take that significance for granted as Toc-
queville and his contemporaries did.  To be sure, the international left, from Petr Kropotkin to 
Eugène Fournière, discussed the political and moral value of associations and declared them 
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to be kernels of ethical socialism.81 Catholic conservatives, such as the French historian and 
sociologist Augustin Cochin, maintained that there was an intimate connection between the 
uncanny rise of mass democracy and associative sociability.  That the first modern party in 
France, the Parti radical, républicain et radical-socialiste, evolved in 1901 out of the Ma-
sonic lodges seemed like an empirical proof for Cochin’s thesis.82  But it is striking how most 
sociologists and political scientists neglected the phenomenon or dealt with it just in passing.  
A typical example is James Bryce’s American Commonwealth (1888), an  attempt to rewrite 
Democracy in America for his time. Like Tocqueville, Bryce traveled around North America 
and collected his observations.  But he was convinced that only an Englishman like himself or 
an American (and, by implication, no Frenchman) ”can grasp the truth that the American peo-
ple is an English people, modified by the circumstances of its colonial life and its more popu-
lar government, but in essentials the same.”83   
Bryce departed from Tocqueville not only in his jingoism.  Positivistic belief in the infal-
libility of facts also informs The American Commonwealth and makes it difficult for today’s 
reader to digest.  While Tocqueville draws powerful conclusions from simple observations, 
Bryce dwells on his empirical material without offering much insight; while Tocqueville stud-
ies the Americans' elusive mores and manners to learn about the workings and hidden dangers 
of democracy, Bryce devotes over a thousand pages to a description of the political institu-
tions of democracy (state and municipal government, political parties and national govern-
ment). Tocqueville devotes two entire chapters to associations and emphasizes their political 
value in creating civic virtue and public spirit.  By contrast, in the single paragraph devoted to 
associational life in his multivolume work, Bryce asserts in sober terms that associations of-
fered practical advantages for the organization of special interests and in influencing public 
opinion.84  According to Bryce, politics has nothing to do with morality and virtue.  It has to 
do with hard facts that can only be determined dispassionately and objectively.  Although 
Bryce often praised his distinguished French predecessor, he criticized Tocqueville’s theory 
of democracy in devastatingly harsh terms: Tocqueville’s ”new political science” may have 
been stimulating, but it certainly was not scientific.  The belief that virtue and politics were 
                                                 
81  Eugène Fournière, L’individu, l’association et l’état (Paris, 1907); Petr Kropotkin, Mutual Aid, a Factor of 
Evolution [1890-1908], ed. Paul Avrich (New York, 1972). Kropotkin describes his vision of associations in an 
article about “anarchy” for the Encyclopaedia Britannica (11th ed., 1910), 1: “Voluntary Associations . . . would 
represent an interwoven network, composed of an infinite variety of groups and federations of all sizes and de-
grees, local, regional, national, and international, temporary or more or less permanent—for all possible pur-
poses: production, consumption and exchange, communications, sanitary arrangements, education, mutual pro-
tection, defense of the territory, and so on; and, on the other side, for the satisfaction of an ever-increasing num-
ber of scientific, artistic, literary and sociable needs.”  
82  See Cochin’s posthumous published Les sociétés de pensée et la démocratie,  Étude d'histoire révolutionnaire 
[1921], new edition under the title: L'esprit du Jacobinisme,  une interprétation sociologique de la Révolution 
Française (Paris, 1979); and Fred Schrader, Augustin Cochin et la République Française (Paris, 1992); Halpern, 
pp. 390-423. 
83  James Bryce, The American Commonwealth, 2: 936, and “The Predictions of Hamilton and Tocqueville” 
[1887], in The American Commonwealth [1888] (Indianapolis, 1995), 2: 1546. 
84  Only one laconic sentence is devoted to associations in ibid., p. 1567: “The habit of association by voluntary 
societies continues to grow.” On Bryce and Tocqueville, see the introduction, by Gary L. McDowell to ibid., 1.  
 23
hopelessly intertwined, together with Tocqueville’s passionate and pessimistic tone, seemed 
to Bryce, and to many contemporary sociologists and political scientists from across the ideo-
logical spectrum and on both sides of the Atlantic, at best antiquated. 
Max Weber is an exception.  Deeply influenced by the sense of crisis that gripped fin de 
siècle Europe, Weber found new meaning in classical political theory’s concern with civic 
virtue and sociability.  Weber was concerned not just with an analysis of rationally organized 
capitalistic society but with modern society’s effect on the ”constitution of souls,” on the 
”humanity of the individuals” (Menschentum) who belonged to it.  In response to the critics of 
his Protestantische Ethik, Weber wrote: ”My central interest was not the advancement of ex-
panding capitalism.  Rather, my concern was with the development of humanity, which was 
created by the intersection of religious and economic elements”, a specific ”ethical lifestyle,” 
as he notes elsewhere, that was spiritually ”adequate” for ”the economic level ‘capitalism‘ 
represented, and which proved that capitalism had conquered the human ‘soul‘.”85  Weber 
thus went beyond the positivistic spirit of the sociologists and political scientists of his day, 
even though he is considered to be representative of them today.  His political concerns are 
also evident in his interest in voluntary associations. 
Weber shared Tocqueville‘s understanding that sociability was fundamental. For Weber, 
it was not just a question of the expansion, interweaving, and composition of associations, but 
rather, a ”question of how human behavior was generally influenced by the varying demands 
of membership in associations.”86 ”How does belonging to an organization affect an individ-
ual internally?” asks Weber. ”Does it exert influence on the personality as such? Which spe-
cific ideal of ‘manliness’ is cultivated deliberately or consciously or even unconsciously?”  
”What connection exists between an association (of any kind), from a political party to, and 
this sounds like a paradox, a bowling league, and what one would call a Weltanschauung in 
the most general sense?”87  In short, what kind of man does civil society produce? 
In his reservations about ordinary bowling leagues, which hold symbolic significance for 
Putnam today, Weber expressed his own skepticism as to whether evoking the connection 
between virtue and sociability was still in keeping with his time.  In the end, ”it was common 
practice that associations that originated in seminal ideas (Weltanschauungsideen) became 
mechanisms that contradicted their original purpose.  This was a result of the ‘tragedy’ inher-
ent in any attempt to realize ideas in practice.”  Furthermore, ”every successful association 
shares the characteristic that as soon as it begins to develop its own machinery and starts to 
spread its propaganda, it will in a sense become banal and dominated by professionals 
(Berufsmenschentum).”  It is these professionals who will, according to Weber, destroy politi-
                                                 
85  Max Weber, Die protestantische Ethik II:  Kritiken und Antikritiken, ed. Johannes Winckelmann (Gütersloh, 
1978), pp. 303 and 55 n. 5, cited by Wilhelm Hennis, Max Webers Wissenschaft vom Menschen (Tübingen, 
1996), p. 44. 
86  Cited from Marianne Weber, Max Weber, Ein Lebensbild [1926], (Munich, 1989), p. 428; similiarly, also, 
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cal virtue, and who will in the future inhabit the capitalistic social order.  He writes passion-
ately at the end of the Protestantischen Ethik that these ”last men” will be ”experts without 
spirit, hedonists without a heart.”88  Like Nietzsche, Weber identified this as the core problem 
of modernity: ”How can we oppose this machinery to keep a part of humanity (Menschentum) 
free from the destruction of the soul that results from the exclusive domination of the bureau-
cratic ideal?”89 
It may have been Nietzsche’s influence that caused Weber to doubt whether voluntary 
associations promoted or hindered this politically dangerous ”destruction of the soul.”  
Nietzsche was mockingly contemptuous of the liberal belief in the political value of sociabil-
ity.  He drew a sharp contrast between his own ”aristocratic concept of virtue” and the coming 
of mass democracy that was apparent in the spread of associations throughout all levels of 
society.  When ”last men” gather together like sheep in ”sociable societies” and ”democratic 
fatherlands,” they lose their true political virtue, which requires isolation and a focus on indi-
vidualism.  In an era of massive associational growth, of ”philistinism” and ”Vereinsmeierei,” 
Nietzsche valued just one virtue: solitude.  ”Solitude is a virtue for us, a sublime tendency and 
impulse toward purity which inevitably guesses how impure relations must be when men 
come into contact with one another in society.”  Nothing seemed more absurd to Nietzsche at 
the end of the nineteenth century than the liberal conviction (based on faith in associations) 
that social interaction leads to civic virtue:  ”Every association breeds vulgarity—in some 
way, in some place, and at some time.”90 
Tocqueville believed throughout his life that face to face interaction in associations was 
the only way to thwart despotism and to ensure that it did not conquer the human ”soul.” Des-
potism walls people off in their private lives and takes advantage of their tendency to keep 
apart.  ”Their feelings toward each other were already growing cold; despotism freezes 
them.”91  However politically opportune a belief in civic virtue and sociability may seem to-
day, historically, the consequences of such a belief were ambiguous.  One of the pastimes of 
nineteenth-century practitioners of civil society was not just working for the common good 
but excluding and disciplining those who did not meet their social or moral standards.92  Vot-
ing in nineteenth century associations was not just an exercise in democratic practice, but 
more often a mechanism for excluding those considered unworthy of the blessings of civil 
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89  Max Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik (Tübingen, 1924), p. 413. 
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society.  Therefore, Tocqueville’s thesis that democracy is fundamentally connected to asso-
ciations, a thesis frequently invoked today by friends of civil society, must be placed in his-
torical perspective.  How associations were constituted, what social and moral claims they 
made, and what occasionally unintended political results those claims may have produced 
must be examined more carefully. 
Even though the nineteenth century was not a democratic age it was the century of de-
mocratisation.  More and more segments of society participated in civic life through voluntary 
associations.  However, a vibrant associational life could entail anti-democratic effects, some-
thing that became even more apparent after the First World War.  It was not a lack of a civic 
tradition of associative sociability that gave rise to fascism in Italy or National Socialism in 
Germany.  To the contrary, those political movements evolved out of the associational net-
work of civil society.93 
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